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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dale Patterson is appealing from his judgment of conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver with a sentence 
enhancement for a repeat offense. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
On October 4, 2007, Patterson sold 2.5 grams of methamphetamines to a 
confidential informaftt for $120. (PSI, p. 2.) On October 12, 2007, Patterson 
sold another 2.3 grams of methamphetamine for $100. (Id.) Both sales 
occurred within 1000 feet of a school and Patterson had been previously 
convicted of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. (PSI, 
pp. 3, 5.) The state charged Patterson with two counts of delivery of a controlled 
substance; each count contained three parts. (R., pp. 32-35.) Part I charged the 
substantive crime of delivery of a controlled substance, a violation of I.C. § 37-
2732(a). (Id.) Part II and Part Ill provided notice of an intent to seek enhanced 
penalties under J.C.§ 37-2739B by alleging that each crime occurred within 1000 
feet of a school (Part II) and that Patterson was previously convicted of 
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver (Part Ill). (Id.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Patterson pied guilty to both counts of 
delivery of a controlled substance and Part Ill of Count I (a prior conviction 
enhancement). (R., pp. 59-60.) The remaining enhancements were dismissed. 
(R., pp. 64-68.) Patterson was sentenced by the district court to a unified fifteen-
1 
year term with a five year minimum period of confinement for both counts, to run 
concurrently. 1 (R., pp. 104-110.) Patterson filed a motion pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 for reduction of the sentence which was denied. (R., pp. 111-
118.) Patterson filed a timely appeal from his judgment of conviction. (R., pp. 
119-122.) 
1 The district court sentenced Patterson to 15 years, with no time fixed for the 
delivery of a controlled substance counts, to run concurrent, and 15 years, with 5 
years fixed, consecutive, for the enhancement. (Tr. p. 37, Ls. 3-11.) 
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ISSUES 
Patterson states the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the district court abuse its sentencing discretion by imposing upon 
Mr. Patterson a sentence which is excessive given any view of the 
facts? 
2. May a defendant receive retained jurisdiction, or a suspended 
sentence, upon imposition of a "fixed minimum" sentence pursuant to 
1.C. § 37-2739B? 
The state phrases the issue on appeal as follows: 
1. Did the district court correctly rule that Idaho Code § 37-2739B(b)(2) 
requires a mandatory minimum sentence and that therefore the court could 
not retain jurisdiction? 
2. Has Patterson failed to show that the sentence he received was an abuse 
of discretion? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Correctly Ruled That I.C. § 37-2739B(b)(2) Requires A 
Mandatory Minimum Sentence And That The Court Could Not Retain Jurisdiction 
A Introduction 
The Idaho Constitution provides that "[T]he legislature can provide 
mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any sentence imposed shall 
not be less that the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory 
minimum sentence so imposed shall not be reduced." Idaho Const. art. V, § 13. 
Patterson contends that: (1) Idaho Code § 37-2739B does not create a 
mandatory minimum fixed sentence, and thus (2) the court could retain 
jurisdiction in his case. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-16.) His argument fails. Idaho 
Code § 37-2739B is a sentence enhancement statute that requires a mandatory 
minimum sentence of five years fixed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the 
Supreme Court exercises free review. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 
79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Ruled That I.C. § 37-2739B(b)(2) Imposes A 
Mandatory Minimum Sentence And That The Court Could Not Retain 
Jurisdiction 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the 
statute. Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362, 79 P.3d at 721. Those words must be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute must be construed 
as a whole. & Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the 
court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); 
State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996). "Ambiguity is 
not established merely because differing interpretations are presented to the 
Court. Otherwise, all statutes would be considered ambiguous." Schwartz, 139 
Idaho at 362, 79 P.3d at 721. 
The plain language of the statute creates a mandatory minimum 
sentence. Idaho Code§ 37-2739B(c) states: 
The fixed minimum terms provided in this section may be imposed 
where the aggravating factors. are separately charged in the 
information or indictment and admitted by the accused or found to 
be true by the trier of fact at the trial of the substantive crime; 
provided, however, that the prosecutor shall give notice to the 
defendant of intent to seek a fixed penalty at least fourteen (14) 
days prior to trial. During a fixed minimum term of confinement 
imposed under this section, the offender shall not be eligible 
for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good 
conduct except for meritorious service. Each fixed minimum term 
imposed shall be served consecutively to the others, and 
consecutively to any minimum term of confinement imposed for the 
substantive offense. 
I.C. § 37-2739B(c) (emphasis added). 
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The mandatory minimum nature of Idaho Code § 37-2739B has been 
addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals which held that a sentencing 
enhancement under that statute requires a mandatory minimum sentence of five 
years, consecutive to any sentence for the underlying offence. State v. Ayala, 
129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996). The Court in Ayala held "that the 
district court correctly perceived the mandatory nature of the fixed minimum 
sentence prescribed by I.C. 37-2739B and the bounds of its sentencing 
discretion in that regard." Ayala 129 Idaho at 918-919, 935 P.2d at 181-182. 
Patterson apparently believes this Court should ignore the plain meaning 
of the statute and specifically overrule the Court of Appeals' decision in Ayala. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15). This argument fails. There is no ambiguity and 
the legislative intent is clear from the plain meaning of the words of the statute. 
The minimum term of imprisonment contemplated for each aggravating factor is 
five years. I.C. § 37-2739B(b). If an aggravating factor is alleged and proven, 
the mandatory minimum sentence is five years fixed, with no eligibility for parole 
or discharge. Patterson's argument that he should get a rider is contrary to the 
plain language of the statute that a defendant "shall not be eligible for parole or 
discharge" and that "each fixed minimum term imposed shall be served 
consecutively." I.C. § 37-2739B(c). If a defendant is not eligible for parole and 
must serve the sentence, he is not eligible for a period of retained jurisdiction or 
probation, or any lesser sentence than the mandatory minimum. 
When read as a whole, it is clear that the statute is intended to require 
mandatory minimum sentences when certain aggravating factors are found. The 
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statute does contain the discretionary word "may" as Patterson points out. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 13). However, when read in context the word "may" grants 
the prosecutor the discretion to seek an enhanced penalty by separately 
charging aggravating factors in the information. Prosecutors have always had 
the authority to reduce charges against a particular suspect or decide whether to 
charge a suspect at all, notwithstanding the provision of the Idaho State 
Constitution under which any mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by the 
legislature may not be reduced. State v. Puetz, 129 Idaho 842, 934 P.2d 15 
(1997). However, once a prosecutor properly alleges an aggravating factor and 
it is proven or admitted, the imposition of a minimum fixed term is not 
discretionary. This view was shared by the Court in Ayala, which held that "The 
district court did not err in imposing a mandatory minimum fixed term of five 
years under I.C. § 37-2739B, as the sentence followed the notice prescribed in 
the statute and the presentation of the required proof." Ayala, 129 Idaho at 183, 
935 P.2d at 183. Thus, once the notice and proof requirements have been met, 
"A mandatory minimum sentence is not subject to reduction by a district court 
because the sentencing requirements are mandatory," and when a defendant 
receives the minimum mandatory sentence prescribed by statute, the sentence 
is not excessive. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 797, 69 P.3d 1052, 1058 
(2003). 
Because the language of Idaho Code § 37-2739B is plain and 
unambiguous there is no basis for engaging in statutory construction. However, 
if the court does engage in any statutory construction it has the duty to ascertain 
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the legislative intent, and give effect to that intent. State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476, 
974 P.2d 1105 (1999). If a statute is found to be ambiguous, then it must be 
construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. Id. To ascertain the 
intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be 
examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the 
statute, and its legislative history. kl Where ambiguity exists as to the elements 
or potential sanctions of a crime, the court will strictly construe the criminal 
statute in favor of the defendant. Id. 
In this case, the legislature stated the policy behind enacting Idaho Code 
§ 37-2739B in the first subsection which reads: 
The legislature intends to allow fixed minimum sentences for 
certain aggravating factors found in cases brought under the 
uniform controlled substances act. The legislature hereby finds and 
declares that trafficking in controlled substances in the state of 
Idaho is a primary contributor to a societal problem that causes 
loss of life, personal injury and theft of property, and exacts a 
tremendous toll on the citizens of this state. To afford better 
protection to our citizens from those who traffic in controlled 
substances, the fixed minimum sentencing contained in 
subsections (b) and (c) of this section is enacted. By enacting fixed 
minimum sentences, the legislature does not seek to limit a court's 
power to impose a greater sentence pursuant to section 19-2513, 
Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 37-2739B(a). 
This statement of policy shows that that legislature wished to provide fixed 
minimum sentences for defendants who deal drugs, and are found to have any 
of the listed aggravating factors. The statute clearly expresses the legislature's 
concern for the societal problems created by drug dealers and the legislature's 
intent to provide "better protection" to society from those drug dealers. Further 
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evidence that the penalty provided by Idaho Code § 37-2739B was intended to 
be a mandatory requirement is found in the legislative "Statement of Purpose" for 
that law, which provides: 
The present Idaho law does not provide for mandatory minimum 
sentences for certain classes of drug dealers. The adoption of 
proposed Idaho Code § 37-2739B is recommended because it will 
insure that persons who deal in the most dangerous forms of 
controUed substances who are repeat offenders, who traffic in or 
near schools, or who supply to children will be incarcerated. 
Statement of Purpose, RS 23817 (emphasis added) (attached as Appendix A). 
The plain language of I.C. § 37-2739B supports the district court's finding 
that it requires a mandatory minimum sentence and the legislative statement of 
purpose for Idaho Code § 37-2739B further evidences a· clear intention by the 
legislature to make the sentences mandatory minimums. Because the clear 
intent of the legislature was to put drug dealers who have aggravated factors in 
prison for a minimum term of five years, the Supreme Court has a duty to give 
effect to that intent. State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476, 97 4 P.2d 1105 (1999). 
Patterson argues that I.C. § 37-2739B is not a true mandatory minimum 
statute, and should be interpreted similarly to the persistent violator statute which 
has been interpreted to allow a court to suspend the sentence given. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16 (citing State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 990 P.2d 
144 (Ct. App. 1999))). Idaho's persistent violator statute reads, in its entirety: 
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of a 
felony, whether the previous convictions were had within the state 
of Idaho or were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be 
considered a persistent violator of law, and on such third conviction 
shall be sentenced to a term in the custody of the state board of 
correction which term shall be for not less than five (5) years and 
said term may extend to life. 
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J.C.§ 19-2514. 
The persistent violator statute is easily distinguished from LC. § 37-
2739B, as it does not contain any language indicating legislative intent to create 
a mandatory minimum, nor does it contain any language that limits the court's 
ability to suspend the sentence. In contrast, J.C. § 37-2739B, the statute 
Patterson stands convicted under, states that "the offender shall not be eligible 
for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct" J.C. 
§ 37-2739B. Further, Patterson's reliance on the Harrington case for his position 
is misplaced. In Harrington the state argued that the 1986 amendments to LC.§ 
19-2513 amended I.C. § 19-2514 by implication to require a mandatory minimum 
sentence for persistent violators. Harrington, 133 Idaho at 148, 990 P.2d at 567. 
The court noted in Harrington, that "the state has submitted no legislative support 
for its implied statutory amendment of LC. § 19-2514" and that "statutory 
amendment by implication is disfavored and will not be inferred absent clear 
legislative intent." ]Q,_ In the present case, the state is not arguing statutory 
amendment by implication and there is clear legislative intent to require 
mandatory minimum sentences both in the text of the statute and in the 
legislative history. 
Because the statute requires a mandatory minimum fixed sentence, the 
district court correctly determined that it had no discretion to retain jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, Patterson's arguments fail. 
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D. If The District Court Erred, The Error Was Harmless Given That The 
District Court Specifically Stated That It Would Not Retain Jurisdiction 
Even if It Had The Discretion To Do So And Patterson Has Shown No 
Abuse of the District Court's Discretion 
The district judge at sentencing was mindful that the mandatory nature of 
Patterson's sentence might be appealed and stated "if I were to feel that I had 
the discretion to grant a retained jurisdiction, I would not do so." (Tr. p. 33, Ls. 
14-16). In the context of sentencing, error is harmless, and remand is 
unnecessary, if it is clear that the sentence would not change. See State v. 
Smith, 122 Idaho 164, 169, 832 P.2d 337, 342 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Morgan, 
109 Idaho 1040, 1043, 712 P.2d 741, 744 (Ct. App. 1985). Because the district 
court's sentence in this case would not change, any error is harmless, absent a 
showing of an abuse of discretion. 
11. 
Patterson Has Failed To Show That The Sentence He Received Was An Abuse 
Of Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Because the district court imposed the minimum sentence mandated by 
the statute, Patterson's sentence cannot be found excessive. "A mandatory 
minimum sentence is not subject to reduction by a district court because the 
sentencing requirements are mandatory," and when a defendant receives the 
minimum mandatory sentence prescribed by statute, the sentence is not 
excessive. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 797, 69 P.3d 1052, 1058 (2003). 
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However, even if the sentence, were not a mandatory minimum, the sentence in 
this case was well within the court's discretion and the district court specifically 
stated that even if it had the discretion to retain jurisdiction, it would not do so. 
(Tr., p. 33, Ls. 14-16.) 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within the statutory limits, the appellate court will only 
review for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). Where reasonable minds might differ as to the length of the 
sentence, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the district 
court. State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 679, 67 P.3d 1283, 1291 (Ct. App. 
2003). 
C. Patterson Has Failed to Show That The Sentence He Received Was An 
Abuse Of Discretion 
Patterson asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing 
a unified fifteen sentence with five years fixed. However, the record amply 
supports the district court's sentencing decision. 
An abuse of discretion will be found only if, in light of the governing 
criteria, the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. 
Kerchusky, 138 Idaho at 679, 67 P.3d at 1291. In making this determination, the 
appellate court will consider the objectives of criminal punishment, which are the 
protection of society, deterrence of the individual defendant and the general 
public, and punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 
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170 P.3d at 401. Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court 
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court conducts an 
independent review of the record, having due regard for the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest. 
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 
Patterson's arguments are essentially that he is a drug addict and wants 
treatment and "prison may very well hamper his recovery" (Appellant's brief, p. 
12). However, he has failed to demonstrate that the sentence he received was 
an abuse of discretion. A sentence of confinement is reasonable if "it appears 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to 
achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution." 
State v. Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 185, 857 P.2d 663, 664 (Ct. App. 1993). A 
sentence need not serve all of the sentencing goals, or weigh each one equally. 
Id. 
The court below considered the appropriate governing criteria of 
sentencing. (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 22 - p. 37, L 1.) In considering Patterson's case, 
the district court placed considerable weight on the protection of society and "the 
havoc that this kind of situation wreaks in our community; and so for that reason, 
sir, I am exercising my discretion against a rider, whether or not I am required to 
do so." (Tr. p. 35, L 10 - p. 36, L 5.) The court did consider Patterson's 
addiction. (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 11-19) However, that was not all the court had to 
consider. Patterson has a lengthy criminal history spanning over twenty years. 
(PSI, pp. 3-5.) He has two prior felony convictions, and served prison time for 
13 
both. (Id.) Patterson's lengthy criminal history includes two prior adult felonies 
for both of which he ultimately went to prison. (PSI, pp. 3-5.) In 1990 he was 
placed on probation after a period of retained jurisdiction for a grand theft 
conviction, but went to prison in 1991 after his probation was revoked. (PSI, p. 
4.) In 2001, he was sent back to prison for a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver. (PSI, p. 5.) 
After considering Patterson's criminal history, along with his current need 
for treatment, the court reasonably determined that imposing a unified fifteen 
year sentence with five years fixed on Patterson was appropriate. Under any 
reasonable view of the facts, Patterson has failed to establish an abuse of 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's determination that 
I.C. §37-2739B requires a mandatory minimum sentence be affirmed by this 
court and that Patterson's judgment of conviction and sentence also be affirmed 
by this court. 
DATED this 9th day of April, 2009. 
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